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We characterize the revenue maximizing mechanism in a two-period model. A risk neutral seller owns
one unit of a durable good and faces a risk neutral buyer whose valuation is private information. The
seller has all the bargaining power; she designs an institution to sell the object at t=0 but she cannot
commit not to change the institution at t=1 if trade does not occur at t=0. The seller’s objective is to
pick the revenue maximizing mechanism. We show that if the probability density function of the buyer’s
valuation satisﬁes certain conditions, the optimal mechanism is to post a price in each period. Previous
work has examined price dynamics when the seller behaves sequentially rationally. We provide a reason
for the seller’s choice to post a price even though she can use inﬁnitely many other possible institutions:
posted price selling is the optimal strategy in the sense that it maximizes the seller’s revenues. Keywords:
mechanism design, optimal auctions, sequential rationality. JEL Classiﬁcation Codes: C72, D44, D82.
1 Introduction
The main goal of a seller is to maximize proﬁts. Theorists (see Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson
(1981)) have provided an answer to the following question. When the seller has incomplete information
∗I am indebted to Professor Reny and Professor Aoyagi for their guidance and support. P. Reny made numerous constructive
suggestions on the model used in this paper. All errors are of course mine.
1about the buyers’ willingness to pay, what is form of the institution that maximizes a seller’s revenues
out of all possible arrangements? The answer is provided under the assumption that the seller can tie
her hands and is able to commit to the institution she chose, even though ex post there may exist more
proﬁtable arrangements. In other words, the revenue maximizing institution is characterized under the
restriction that the seller will behave in a non-credible way. If one relaxes this assumption, in other words,
if the seller behaves sequentially rationally, what is the form of the revenue maximizing mechanism? This
is the question we aim to answer.
Why ? It seems a more natural scenario. In many instances the assumption that the seller can tie
her hands, even though ex-post it may turn out that she has more attractive possibilities, is far fetched.
In practice people are often tempted not to commit as the following examples demonstrate. Christies in
Chicago auctions the same bottles of wine that failed to sell in earlier auctions. The government reauctions
properties that fail to sell: lumber tracts, oil tracts and real estate are put up in a newauction if no bidder
bids above the reserve price1. McAfee and Vincent (1997), note that “either implicitly or by explicit policy,
auctioneers are acknowledging the impossibility of resisting a temptation to try to resell an object who
failed to meet a reserve price at an earlier auction.”
To illustrate the situation let us look at the following scenario. Consider a risk neutral seller who owns
one unit of a durable good that is of no value to her. She decides to auction the item using a revenue
maximizing institution. She faces just one risk neutral buyer whose valuation is unknown but is distributed
according to a continuous distribution f(.) on a closed interval, which is common knowledge. The seller
who is aware of the work of Myerson (1981) knows that in this situation the optimal, in terms of revenue,
institution is to post a price. Suppose that the there are T=2 periods, t=0,1. The buyer announces his
valuation to the seller and if it is above the seller’s posted price, he obtains the object and pays the price.
Suppose that at date 0 the seller posts the price that maximizes ex-ante revenues but the buyer announces
a valuation belowthe price. No trade takes place. It is w ell know n that in order for the seller to maximize
her ex-ante expected revenues she should commit to tie her hands and not try to sell the item again using
1These examples are also mentioned in McAfee and Vincent (1997).
2a diﬀerent institution in a subsequent period. After the buyer declines the initial sale contract, it is not
sequentially rational for the seller to tie her hands. At date 1 the seller knows that there exist gains from
trade but they were not realized because the price she posted was above the buyer’s valuation. If the seller
behaves sequentially rationally, then if no trade takes place at t=0, the seller will try to sell the item at
t=1 using a diﬀerent institution that maximizes revenues from that point on, which clearly changes the
buyer’s strategic considerations at t=0. What does the revenue maximizing mechanism look like in this
case? Does the seller oﬀer a set of lotteries at period t=0 or does she simply post a price? Does the seller
use a ﬁrst period mechanism that allows her to infer with precision the type of the buyer in the case the
buyer rejects this mechanism, hoping that she can use her sharper estimate to extract the buyer’s surplus
in the second period? Or is it too costly in terms of expected revenues to do so?
In this paper we characterize the revenue maximizing mechanism when the seller behaves sequentially
rationally. We showthat the seller w ill maximize her expected revenues by posting a price in each period.
The revenue maximizing mechanism is derived out of a very general class of mechanisms. This work extends
the works of Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Hart and Tirole (1988). We show that for
any possible history of the game, at the beginning of the period t=1 the seller will maximize expected
revenues by posting a price. This result is derived restricting attention to direct revelation mechanisms
since the seller’s problem at the beginning of t=1 is isomorphic to the problem with full commitment.
Subsequently, we derive the revenue maximizing set of contracts for t=0, denoted by M0.T h i si sam o r e
diﬃcult task since one cannot appeal to the revelation principle. M0 is derived under some conditions
imposed on the probability density function of the buyer’s valuation. We do not impose any restrictions
on the potential form of M0. Under the assumptions made, M0 is equivalent to a posted price. Previous
work has assumed that the seller’s strategy is to post a price and the problem of the seller is to ﬁnd what
price to post. We provide a reason for the seller’s choice to post a price even though she can use inﬁnitely
many other possible institutions: posted price selling is the optimal strategy in the sense that it maximizes
the seller’s revenues.
31.1 Related Literature
This question has not been addressed previously in the economics literature but is related to the optimal
auctions literature, to the durable goods monopolist literature and to the incentives literature that studies
repeated relationships.
The Optimal Auction Literature ( Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981)), characterizes the
revenue maximizing mechanism for a risk neutral seller facing a ﬁxed number of risk neutral buyers. The
optimal auction form is derived assuming that the seller can tie her hands in the case that the item failed
to sell in the auction. When the seller is not able to commit to this static optimal institution, and she oﬀers
a newsetup, in case the static one failed to realize any gains from trade, she scariﬁes ex-ante expected
revenues.
The Durable Goods Monopolist literature (Bulow(1982), Stockey (1981), Gul-Sonnenschein-Wilson
(1986)) examines the situation where a monopolist who owns a unit of a durable good faces a continuum
o fc o n s u m e r s . T h es e l l e ri sn o ta b l et oc o m m i tt op o s tt h es a m ep r i c ea te a c hp e r i o d . I no t h e rwo r d s
the seller is assumed to behave sequentially rationally. These papers examine whether the equilibrium
sequence of price oﬀers satisﬁes Coase’s Conjecture, which states that when oﬀers take place quickly the
seller opens the market with a price close to 0 (the lowest possible buyer’s valuation), and all potential
gains from trade are realized instantaneously. These papers verify the Coase’s Conjecture under certain
assumptions, among others stationarity of the buyer’s strategy in the no-gap case.2 The catalytic eﬀect of
introducing sequential rationality into the monopolist’s problem must be considered with caution. Ausubel
and Deneckere (1989a) showthat in the no-gap case, w ithout the stationarity assumption about the buyer’s
strategy, a durable good monopolist’s proﬁts can be arbitrarily close to the static monopoly proﬁts.
The durable goods monopoly literature characterizes the revenue maximizing sequence of prices when
the seller behaves sequentially rationally. In this paper we characterize the revenue maximizing mechanism
when the seller behaves sequentially rationally in a ﬁnite horizon framework.
The literature of incentives has analyzed repeated principal - agent relationships under three assump-
2In the “no-gap” case the lowest possible valuation of the buyer, v, is less or equal to the seller’s cost.
4tions regarding commitment. In the ﬁrst approach, “full commitment”, the principal commits to the
optimal static incentive scheme at each period, which can be enforced by a third party if either of the
parties refuses to do so. See for instance Baron and Bensako (1984a). The principal also commits never
to renegotiate this incentive scheme even though a renegotiation may lead to a pareto improving incentive
scheme at some point in time.
In the “non-commitment” approach the principal oﬀers at the beginning of each period a contract that
will be implemented in the current period. The principal is restricted to oﬀering only short term contracts.
The analysis of dynamic incentives run by short term contracts is complex (see Freixas, Guisnerie, Tirole
(1985), Laﬀont and Tirole (1988), Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) ch 9, among others).
The last approach, “commitment with renegotiation” assumes that a principal involved in a repeated
relationship can oﬀer a long term incentive scheme that can be renegotiated at each date. All transfer
payments take place in the last period. The principal (the uninformed party) can oﬀer at each date a new
incentive scheme for the remainder of the relationship. Renegotiation proof contracts are ex-post pareto
eﬃcient.
The literature of non-commitment and commitment and renegotiation studies repeated relationships.
In our model, trade will take place once, if at all. This is similar to the durable good sale model. As noted
earlier, the durable good monopoly literature has looked so far at sale contracts that consist of a price
at each period. We will allow for any possible arrangement. We should note that the optimal incentive
scheme under non-commitment and under commitment and renegotiation is not known for the case that
the agent’s possible types are a continuum.
The papers most closely related to this work are the papers by Hart and Tirole (1988) and McAfee and
Vincent (1997).
Hart and Tirole (1988) analyze the sale and the rental model of a durable good in the case that the
buyer has two possible types under non-commitment, and under commitment and renegotiation. In their
analysis, the seller’s strategy under non-commitment, is a price for each period and the result for the sale
model is the one of the durable good monopoly. The equilibrium of the rental model under non-commitment
converges to a non-discrimination equilibrium where the seller charges the lowest valuation each period
5as the horizon tends to inﬁnity. In their analysis of the rental and the sale model with commitment
and renegotiation, they allowfor any possible contract form. The optimal contract form exhibits coasian
dynamics and is the same for the sale and the rental model. The optimal long term renegotiation-proof
contract is not known for the case that the buyer’s possible types are a continuum.
McAfee and Vincent in Sequentially Optimal Auctions (1997) examine sequentially optimal auctions
under the assumption that the seller’s strategy consists of posting a reserve price, and the buyers followa
stationary strategy. In their model the seller faces a ﬁxed number of buyers and the optimal institution
is derived out of a restricted class: the auction format is ﬁxed and the seller posts at each date a reserve
price. They showthat w hen the time period betw een oﬀers is short, the reserve price in the ﬁrst period
is close to the lowest possible valuation and the seller’s revenues converge to the revenues with no reserve
price.
In short, most of the literature3 has ﬁxed the form of the mechanism (a price in the durable goods
literature and a reserve price in the sequentially optimal auctions literature) and searches for the optimal
price (reserve price) path when the seller is unable to commit intertemporally to an institution. In this
paper we study the sale model of a durable good under non-commitment and we derive the optimal
mechanism.
2 The Environment
As e l l e ro wn so n eu n i to fa ni t e mt h a ti sd u r a b l ef o r2p e r i o d s ,t = 0 , 1 .T h es e l l e r ’ sv a l u a t i o nf o rt h ei t e mi s
normalized to zero. She faces just one buyer whose valuation is unknown. Let f :[ 0 ,1] →￿ + continuous,
denote the probability density function of the buyer’s valuation. We assume that f(.) is common knowledge.
Both the seller and the buyer are risk neutral. The seller can chose any institution to sell her object
but cannot commit not to change it in case it fails to sell the object. Her goal is to maximize revenues. Let
3With the exception of Hart and Tirole’s (1988) two-type model, where they characterize the optimal renegotiation proof
contract out of a general class. Note though, that when they derive the optimal sale contract under no commitment, the
seller’s strategy is just to post a price at each period.
6Figure 1: The space of contracts.
δ denote the common discount factor.
Deﬁnition 1 A mechanism consists of 2 sets of points in ￿2 one for each period, denoted by M0 and M1.
Mi,i=1 ,2 is the set of contracts available at period i. A point (p,x) ∈ Mi,i=1 ,2, denotes a contract.
The ﬁrst element of each pair denotes the probability of obtaining the object and the second element of each
pair denotes the expected payment.
Ap a i r( p,x) is the reduced outcome of some potentially very complicated institution. We refer to it as
contract for simplicity. If a buyer with valuation v accepts contract (p,x) his expected payoﬀ is given by
pv − x.
See Figure 1 for a typical indiﬀerence curve in the space of contracts.
In our setting the buyer and the seller will trade only once, if at all. The timing is as follows. Nature
moves ﬁrst and draws the valuation of the buyer.
At the beginning of period zero the seller oﬀers a set of contracts M0 that are realized at period t=0.
The buyer can choose a contract out of M0, choose the contract (0,0) at t=0, which is the ’exit’ option,
or wait until period t=1. The contract (0,0) is taken to be the legal status quo. If the buyer chooses a
contract out of M0, or the status quo contract, the game ends at t=0.
7Figure 2: The game
8If the buyer, after seeing M0, d e c i d e st owa i twem o v eo nt op e r i o dt = 1 . T h es e l l e ro ﬀ e r sas e to f
contracts M1 that are realized in period 1. At t=1 the buyer can choose a contract out of M1 or contract
(0,0). A contract (p,x)i nM1 corresponds to (δp,δx) at t=0. We assume that the buyer prefers to accept
the status quo contract (0,0) at t=0 than at t=1.
2.1 Equilibrium
The seller’s strategy, σS, is a mechanism ( M0,M 1(M0,σB0)). The set of contracts oﬀered at t=1, M1, is
a function of the seller’s information at date t=1, i.e. the buyer’s action at t=0 given that M0 was oﬀered.
The buyer’s strategy, σB is a sequence of choices(σB0(v,M0),σB1(v,M0,σB0,M1)). The buyer at t=0 can
accept a contract out of M0, accept the status quo contract, (0,0), or wait (choose ∅). The buyer’s action
at t=0 depends on M0, i.e. the set of contracts oﬀered at t=0, and on his valuation. The buyer at t=1 can
choose a contract out of M1 or the status quo contract. Again the buyer’s action depends on the history
of the game at t=1 given by (M0,σB0,M 1) and on his valuation. In a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the
game the following conditions must hold.
1.For all v ∈ [0,1] σB1 maximizes the buyer’s payoﬀ at t=1.
2.M1 maximizes expected revenues given the seller’s updated beliefs and the buyer’s strategy at t=1.
Posterior beliefs f1 depend on the history (M0,σB0). Let f1 denote the posterior PDF of the buyer’s
valuation.
3.For all v ∈ [0,1] σB0 maximizes the buyer’s payoﬀ given t=1 strategies.
4.M0 maximizes the seller’s expected revenues given subsequent strategies.
5. f1 is Bayes’ consistent with f, the buyer’s strategy, and the buyer’s observed actions at t=0.
For reasons of tractability we will look at equilibria of the following reduced game. At the beginning of
period zero the seller announces her strategy (M0,M 1).4 M0 contains the contract (0,0) which is the legal
status quo. The legal status quo contract is equivalent to the buyer rejecting all the contracts in M0\(0,0)
and in M1. The buyer can do so in period t=0. This contract should be interpreted as an outside option,
4For brevity we omit the arguments from the players’ strategies.
9as noted earlier. The seller’s strategy, σS, is a mechanism (M0,M 1) and the buyer’s strategy, σB is a
choice of a point of ￿2 that belongs in M0∪M1. If the buyer chooses a contract out of M0,i ti sr e a l i z e da t
period t=0 and the game ends. Contracts in M1 are realized at t=1. A contract (p,x)i nM1 corresponds
to (δp,δx)a tt = 0 .
The diﬀerence of the reduced game is that the seller announces his strategy at the beginning of t=0
and the fact that the outside option is a contract in M0.
We are looking for a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the reduced game.
1. For all v ∈ [0,1],σ B maximizes the buyer’s payoﬀ. In other words, a buyer with valuation v chooses
(p∗,x ∗) ∈ arg max
(p,v)∈M0∪M1
(pv − x). (1)
2. M1 must be optimal at the beginning of t=1 given the seller’s posterior beliefs about the buyer’s
valuation given by f1(.), and the buyer’s strategy at t=1.
3. M0 must maximize expected revenues for the seller given subsequent strategies.
4. f1 is Bayes’ consistent with f, the buyer’s strategy and the buyer’s observed actions at t=0.
Note that in a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the original game when the seller announces M0 the
buyer can ﬁgure out what the seller will do in the history (M0,wait). In other words, the buyer after seeing
M0 can ﬁgure out the optimal M1. Given that when the buyer sees M0 he can induce what the seller will
do, if he decides to wait, it follows that in the case the buyer prefers to exit and not choose a contract out
of M0 or out of M1, he will do so at t=0. The reduced game allows the buyer to exit at t=0 after seeing
M0, if he wishes to do so. From the above observations it follows that an equilibrium of the reduced game
is an equilibrium of the original game. The opposite is not necessarily true.
2.2 Methodology
B e f o r ewem o v eo nt oc h a r a c t e r i z et h eo p t i m a lm e c h a n i s mwewo u l dl i k et om a k eac o u p l eo fr e m a r k s
regarding the methodology we will use to derive the equilibrium. Recall that t=1 is the ﬁnal period of
the game. This operates as a device for commitment which implies that the seller’s problem at t=1 is
10isomorphic to the static problem. For this reason the mechanism designer can appeal to the revelation
principle and choose M1 among the class of direct revelation mechanisms. For a deﬁnition of a direct
revelation auction game see Myerson (1981).
At t=0 the situation is diﬀerent. In the absence of commitment, the seller cannot appeal to the
revelation principle when she designs the sale contracts in M0. Suppose that M0 is a direct revelation
mechanism, the buyer has claimed to have valuation v, and according to M0 no trade takes place. If the
seller behaves sequentially rationally, she will try to sell the object at t=1 using a diﬀerent mechanism.
And in the case that the buyer has revealed his valuation at t=0, the seller will use this information to
extract all his surplus. In this situation the buyer has an incentive to manipulate the seller’s beliefs at
t=0. One would expect that the buyer will not reveal his valuation truthfully at the beginning of the
relationship. This is the reason why, when the seller behaves sequentially rationally, restricting attention
to direct revelation mechanisms is with loss of generality. The seller, since she does not have commitment
power, cannot play the role of the “machine” that exogenously speciﬁes the direct revelation game that
implements an equilibrium of some general game. This is the reason why M0 is determined among arbitrary
sets of contracts.
•EXAMPLE 1: When choosing M0 the seller cannot appeal to the revelation principle:
Consider a seller who owns an item of zero value to her facing one buyer whose valuation is drawn
from the uniform distribution on [0,1]. The seller decides to employ the mechanism described in Myerson
in (1981). If the buyer claims to have valuation above 0.5 he obtains the object and pays 0.5. Otherwise,
no transaction is made. In the case that the seller can commit not to resell the item, this mechanism
is incentive compatible, individually rational and maximizes expected revenues for the seller. Suppose
that the seller cannot commit, and that the buyer claimed that his valuation is 0.48. Under the original
arrangement no transaction is made. In the absence of commitment, the seller will make another oﬀer at
the second stage of, say 0.4799. In such an environment the seller will use the information revealed by
the buyer in the ﬁrst stage to extract all his surplus; it is no longer incentive compatible for the buyer to
reveal his valuation truthfully. In any situation where the seller cannot commit herself to an institution
(and choosing the right one in each information set is part of her strategy) one is no longer able to appeal
11to the revelation principle. This is because the seller is a player in the game and her role is not restricted
to just pick the right institution once.
3 The seller’s problem at t=1
3.1 Characterization of continuation equilibria
In this section we characterize the revenue maximizing set of contracts at t=1, M1, for any history of the
game. A given M0 characterizes the history h1 =( M0, wait). In a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium M1 must
be an equilibrium of the continuation game that starts after a history h1. At t=1 the seller, given her
posterior beliefs about the buyer’s valuation, which are determined by the history of the game h1, seeks
M1 that maximizes her expected revenues from that point on. Recall that f1 stands for the posterior
probability distribution of the buyer’s valuation. In the case that f1 is generic, in other words the buyer’s
valuation is fully revealed after some history h1 =( M0,wait), the seller’s problem at t=1 is trivial. The
seller names a price equal to the buyer’s valuation and extracts all his surplus. In what follows we assume
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We choose M1 among the class of direct revelation mechanisms. It is shown, that for any history h1 =
(M0,wait), the revenue maximizing mechanism at t=1 is a posted price. We also showa w ay to ﬁnd the
optimal price. The buyer’s valuation is drawn from a posterior distribution f1(.) that is not necessarily




p(v)[vf1(v)− [1− F1(v)]]dv −U(0). (5)
The optimal mechanism should extract all the surplus from the lowest valuation buyer, U(0) = 0. So the
seller’s revenues can be rewritten as
￿ 1
0
p(v)[vf1(v) − [1 − F1(v)]]dv. (6)
Let
φ(v)=vf1(v) −[1 −F1(v)]. (7)
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p :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] such that p is measurable,
continuous everywhere form above, increasing
and p(0) = 0 and p(1) = 1

    
    
(9)
and φ(.)i sm e a s u r a b l e .
We ﬁrst establish that the seller’s maximization problem is well deﬁned7.
Proposition 1 8(i)The maximization problem deﬁned in (8) has a maximum.
(ii)The maximizer of (8) is of the form
pv(t)=1 if t>v
=0 if t ≤ v. (10)
5See Myerson (1981) for more details.










but since this quantity is not always well deﬁned when f1(t)=0f o rs o m et ∈ [0,1] we will use the form given by (5).
7Proofs of the results not provided in the main text, are in the Appendix.
8The proof of Proposotion (1) has been outlined by Phil Reny.
13Proof. See Appendix.
The following proposition is closely related to Proposition (1). It not only shows that the maximizer
is one of the extreme points of ￿, it also describes a way to ﬁnd the maximizer. It states that, for any
possible history of the game, the seller at t=1 will maximize expected revenues from that point on by
posting a price. Since t=1 is the last period of the game, the seller’s problem is the same as in the case
of commitment. Myerson (1981) characterizes the optimal auction under commitment. We extend his
analysis a step further by not requiring f1 to be continuous nor strictly positive.
Proposition 2 (i) The maximizer of the problem deﬁned in (8) is of the following form
pv∗(t)=1 if t>v ∗




v ∈ [0,1] such that
￿ ˜ v
v
φ(t)dt ≥ 0, for all ˜ v ∈ [v,1]
￿
. (12)
(ii) Let x = v∗. The following mechanism
p(v)=1 if v>x
=0 if v ≤ x (13)
and
x(v)=x if v>x
=0 if v ≤ x (14)
is the optimal feasible mechanism for t=1.
Proof. See Appendix.
The optimal mechanism speciﬁes that if the buyer claims to have valuation above x obtains the object
with probability one and pays x. In other words the seller will maximize her expected revenues at t=1 by
posting a price equal to x.
143.2 Implications
So far we have proved that no matter how the seller’s objective function at t=1 looks like, the optimal
mechanism for the seller in period 1 is to post a price. Proposition (2) shows a way to ﬁnd this optimal
price. Recall that V1 is the set of v￿s such that a buyer with valuation v,p r e f e r sM1 to M0. The fact that
M1 is a posted price implies the following result.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the set of possible buyer’s valuations is convex. In an equilibrium the set V1
is convex.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition (3) says that if the buyer’s possible type is a convex set, say an interval, V1 will be an
interval as well (it may be possible that V1 contains only one element; if this is the case if the buyer after
seeing M0 decides to wait, the sellers knows the buyer’s valuation at the beginning of t=1).
Suppose that the buyer seeing M0 decides to wait. We know from Proposition (3) that V1 is convex.
Assume that f1 is non-generic, that is assume that V1 contains more than one element. If the buyer after
seeing M0 prefers to wait, the seller believes at t=1 that she is facing a buyer with valuation in [v,¯ v].M 1
must be chosen optimally given posterior beliefs f1 and beliefs must be fulﬁlled along the equilibrium path.
We designate with x the price posted at t=1 which is given by
x =i n f
￿
v ∈ [0,1] such that
￿ ˜ v
v
















Let vL =i n fV1 and vH =s u pV1.9
In an equilibrium beliefs must be fulﬁlled so it must hold that
v = vL and ¯ v = vH
9Note that vH >v L, since we assumed that V1 contains more than one element.
15We assumed that f(.)i sc o n t i n u o u swh i c hi m p l i e st h a t f1(.)d e ﬁ n e di n( 1 6 )i sc o n t i n u o u sa swe l l .N o w we
argue that x deﬁned in (15) will be a root of the equation
xf1(x) − [1 −F1(x)] = 0.
This follows from the following arguments. If x is such that this expression is negative, i.e.
xf1(x)− [1 − F1(x)] < 0
then, by continuity there exists ε>0 small enough such that
￿ x+ε
x
[xf1(x) −[1 −F1(x)]]dt < 0
but this contradicts the deﬁnition of x given in (15). In the case that x is such that
xf1(x)− [1 − F1(x)] > 0
then by continuity, there exists ε￿ > 0 small enough such that
￿ x
x−ε￿
[xf1(x)− [1 − F1(x)]]dt > 0
which contradicts the deﬁnition of x.
Hence, given that the seller is facing a buyer with valuation in [vL,v H] the price posted at t=1 will be
one of the solutions of the following equation













which is equivalent to
xf(x)+F(x) −F(vH)=0 . (18)
Proposition 4 The price posted at t=1, x, is a non-decreasing function of vH, and hence it is diﬀerentiable
almost everywhere.
16Proof. Recall that x is a root of yf(y)+F(y) − F(vH) = 0 (the solution of this equation, x, depends
on vH). Let x￿ be a root of yf(y)+F(y) − F(vH + ε)=0 , where ε>0. Note that x￿ is a root of the
function yf(y)+F(y) shifted down by F(vH + ε)a n dx is a root of the same function shifted down by
F(vH), where of course F(vH + ε) >F (vH). From this observation and from the deﬁnition of x and x￿it
holds that x ≤ x￿.
We conclude that the price posted at t=1 will be an increasing function of vH, which put simply means
that the price that the seller charges in the second period is higher, the higher the upper bound of the
support of the posterior PDF of the buyer’s valuation is.
4 The behavior of the Buyer- Relevant Contracts
At t=0 the seller announces her strategy. The buyer is faced with M0 and M1 and wants to pick the
contract that maximizes his welfare. Recall that the buyer solves
(p∗,x ∗) ∈ arg max
(p,v)∈M0∪M1
(pv − x)
Deﬁnition 2 Ac o n t r a c tC in ￿2
+ is irrelevant with respect to M ⊂￿ 2
+ if there does not exist v ∈ [0,1]
such that, given all the other available contracts in M, a buyer with valuation v ﬁnds weakly optimal to
choose C.
Deﬁnition 3 M is a relevant set of contracts if for all C ∈ M, C is not irrelevant with respect to M. A
contract that is not irrelevant is called relevant.
T h es e l l e ri si n t e r e s t e do n l yi no ﬀering relevant sets of contracts, since irrelevant contracts will not
aﬀect the buyer’s behavior no matter what his valuation is.
Remark 1 It is without loss of generality that the seller restricts attention to relevant sets of contracts.
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5.1 The structure of M0 when it contains K relevant contracts.




where K is ﬁnite and ﬁxed but potentially very large. These contracts are taken to be distinct. The seller
is interested in oﬀering points that can be potentially chosen by the buyer. In this section we examine the
structure of a set that contains a ﬁxed and ﬁnite number of relevant contracts.
The elements of M0 are taken to be distinct since oﬀering the same point twice will not change the
allocation. Consider the set M0 deﬁned in (19). We order this ﬁnite set of points according to the ﬁrst
coordinate, that is, the point which has the lowest p is called point 0 and
p0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ .... ≤ pK−1.
Nowconsider tw o (distinct) points in M0, (pi,x i)a n d( pj,x j) that have the same ﬁrst coordinate, that is
pi = pj. Since these points are distinct one of the two must have a higher second coordinate say without
loss xj >x i. For all v in [0,1]
piv − xi >p iv −xj
therefore no buyer will choose (pj,x j)wh e n( pi,x i) is available, which implies that (pj,xj)i si r r e l e v a n t .
Hence when the seller oﬀers M0 that contains K relevant points it must be the case that
0=p0 <p 1 <p 2 <. . . . .<p K−1.
We assumed that (0,0), which is the status quo contract, is an element of M0 so we take p0 =0 . N o t e
also in order that (p0,x0)b er e l e v a n ti tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tx0 =0 , since if it were positive no buyer
would ﬁnd individually rational to pick a contract that assigns zero probability of obtaining the object and
positive expected payment.
18Nowconsider tw o adjacent contracts, say ( p1,x 1)a n d( p2,x 2). These points deﬁne a line with some





Note that v1 denotes the valuation of the buyer who is indiﬀerent between these two contracts. A buyer
with valuation v>v 1 prefers (p2,x 2)t o( p1,x 1) and a buyer with valuation v<v 1 prefers (p1,x 1)t o
(p2,x 2).
If v1 > 1 no buyer with valuation in [0,1] picks point (p2,x 2). If v1 < 0n ob u y e rwi t hv a l u a t i o n v in
[0,1] picks contract (p1,x 1). Hence in order that (p1,x 1)a n d( p2,x 2) be relevant, v1 must be in [0,1]. This
fact implies that since p1 <p 2 and
p1v1 −x1 = p2v1 −x2
that
(p2 −p1)v1 = x2 −x1 ≥ 0.
In other words, when (p1,x 1)a n d( p2,x 2)a r er e l e v a n t ,t h e ni th o l d st h a tx1 ≤ x2. So if M0 contains K
relevant points it holds that
0=x0 ≤ x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ...... ≤ xK−1.
Let v2 = x3−x2
p3−p2 be the valuation of the buyer who is indiﬀerent between (p2,x 2)a n d( p3,x 3). Noww e move
on to showthat if v1 >v 2, then contract (p2,x 2) will be irrelevant. Recall that v1 = x2−x1
p2−p1. If v1 >v 2 then
the line segment that connects contract (p1,x 1) and contract (p3,x 3)h a ss l o p ev￿. So given that (p3,x 3)
is available a buyer with valuation v less than v￿ = x3−x1
p3−p1 prefers (p1,x 1)t o( p3,x 3) and a buyer with
valuation greater than v￿prefers (p3,x 3)t o( p1,x 1). Note that v￿ ∈ (v2,v 1). Contract (p2,x 2) is irrelevant.
By assuming that the seller oﬀers only relevant contracts we get that
x1
p1
≤ v1 ≤ v2 ≤ ...... ≤ vK−2.
A typical set of contracts that contains a ﬁnite number of elements is depicted in Figure 3.
19Figure 3: A relevant set of contracts with a ﬁnite number of elements.
5.2 Relevant mechanisms (M0,M 1) when M0 contains K contracts.
We proceed to examine the relationship of M1 with the K contracts in M0 when the set M0∪M1 is relevant.
We require M1, the price posted at t=1, to be optimal given beliefs after the history (M0,wait). It has
been shown that no matter what posterior beliefs are at the beginning of t=1, M1 will be a posted price.
M1 i sap o s t e dp r i c ea tt = 1s oa tt = 0i tc o r r e s p o n d st oap o i n t( δ,δx). Nowsuppose that the seller
oﬀers M0 that consists of K contracts, (p0,x 0),.....,( pK−1,x K−1). If M0 ∪M1 is relevant, then M1 relates
to M0 in the following way
0=p0 <p 1 < ..... < pl−1 <δ<p l <. . . . .<p K−1 (20)
x0 ≤ x1 ≤ ... ≤ xl−1 ≤ δx ≤ xl ≤ .... ≤ xK−1. (21)
Note that it is very well possible that M0 contains a contract (pm,x m)s u c ht h a tpm = δ but then either
(pm,x m)o rM1 will be irrelevant. In an equilibrium where the set M0∪M1 is relevant, M0 will not contain
contracts like (pm,x m).
Label M1 by a name that indicates its ordering relative to contracts in M0,s a y( pl,x l) and relabel the
contracts to the right of (pl,x l)a c c o r d i n g l y .N o wl e t( pl−1,x l−1) be its neighboring point to the left and
20(pl+1,x l+1) be its neighboring point to the right. After renaming we get that
0=p0 <p 1 < ..... < pl−1 <p l <p l+1 <. . . . .<p K (22)
x0 ≤ x1 ≤ ... ≤ xl−1 ≤ xl ≤ xl+1 ≤ .... ≤ xK (23)
where (pl,x l)=( δ,δx)=M1.
Let vl−1 be the valuation of the buyer who is indiﬀerent between (pl−1,x l−1)a n dM1 = {(pl,x l)} and
let vl be the valuation of the buyer who is indiﬀerent between M1 and (pl+1,x l+1). When M1 = {(pl,x l)}
a buyer with valuation in [vl−1,v l] prefers M1 to accepting a contract out of M0.
By the assumption that M0 ∪M1 is a relevant set of contracts we have that
x1
p1
≤ v1 ≤ v2 ≤ v3 ≤ .... ≤ vl−1 ≤ vl ≤ ..... ≤ vK−1 (24)
where v1 = x2−x1
p2−p1 ,v 2 = x3−x2
p3−p2,...,v l−1 =
δx−xl−1
δ−pl−1 ,v l =
xl+1−δx
pl+1−δ ,....,v K−1 =
xK−xK−1
pK−pK−1.
5.3 Characterization of Equilibrium M0
In this section we characterize the optimal M0. In equilibrium M0 must maximize the seller’s expected
revenues. We restricted the seller’s strategy by assuming that in equilibrium M0 ∪ M1 must be a relevant
set of contracts. This is without loss of generality because contracts that are irrelevant are never chosen
in equilibrium nor aﬀect the buyer’s behavior.


















The goal of the seller is, taking p￿
is as given, to chose corresponding expected payments x￿
is that maximize
her revenues taking into account the fact that x￿
is aﬀect v￿
is and M1 is chosen optimally given updated
10Recall that (p0,x 0) is the status quo contract (0,0).
21beliefs. We require that M0 ∪ M1 be relevant which implies the constraints
x1
p1
≤ v1 ≤ v2 ≤ v3 ≤ .... ≤ vl−1 ≤ vl ≤ ..... ≤ vK−1.
We also require that M1 be a continuation equilibrium. In the event that the buyer, after seeing M0 prefers
t owa i t ,t h es e l l e rb e l i e v e sa tt = 1t h a ts h ei sf a c i n gab u y e rwi t hv a l u a t i o ni n[ vl−1,v l].M 1 must be chosen
optimally given posterior beliefs f1 and beliefs must be fulﬁlled along the equilibrium path.
Assumption D: Fix arbitrary x and y in [0,1], such that y>x .We assume that
F(y) −F(x) ≥ f(x)− f(y).11
Lemma 1 Assume that the valuation of the buyer is distributed according to f that satisﬁes Assumption
D. Suppose that M0 is chosen among sets that contain ﬁnitely many contracts. Then in equilibrium x￿
is in
M0 are chosen such that
x1
p1
= v1 = ...... = vl−1 = x (25)
and




Contracts (p1,x 1),....,(pl−1,x l−1) and (pl+1,x l+1),....,(pK−1,x K−1) are chosen with probability zero; they
are essentially irrelevant. Contract (pK,x K) is the only contract in M0, other than status quo contract
(0,0), which is chosen with strictly positive probability in equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
The above lemma states that in equilibrium x￿
is are chosen such that contracts (p1,x 1),....,(pl−1,x l−1)
lie on the line segment through (0,0) and (δ,δx)12 which has slope x. Any of theses contracts may be
chosen only in the event that the buyer has valuation x, which occurs with probability zero.
Similarly, in equilibrium (pl+1,x l+1),....,(pK−1,x K−1) lie on the line segment that goes through (δ,δx)a n d
(pK,x K) and has slope vK−1. These contracts are chosen with probability zero. Contract (pK,x K)i st h e
11From the mean value theorem for integrals, this inequality can be rewritten as f(c)(y−x) ≥ f(x)−f(y)f o rs o m ec ∈ (x,y).
12Recall that contract (δ,δx) has been renamed as (pl,x l).
22only contract in M0, other than status quo contract (0,0), which is chosen with strictly positive probability
in equilibrium.
We proceed to showthat in equilibrium pK =1 .
Lemma 2 In equilibrium when M0 is chosen among sets that contain ﬁnitely many contracts, the seller
sets pK =1 .
Proof. See Appendix.
Summarizing, in equilibrium, if the buyer has valuation less than x13, he will choose the status quo
contract at t=0, if his valuation is between x and vK−1, where x<v K−1, he will choose to wait and pay
x at t=1, whereas if his valuation is greater than vK−1 he chooses to pay xK at t=0.
Theorem 1 When the seller chooses M0 among sets that contain ﬁnitely many contracts, the seller max-
imizes expected revenues by posting a price in each period.
Proof. T h er e s u l tf o l l o wsf r o mL e m m a1a n dL e m m a2 .
O u rr e s u l ti m p l i e st h a tM0 equivalent to a posted price is weakly better than M0 containing just the
exit option. The reason is that xK can be chosen such that all trade takes place at t=1.
6 The revenue maximizing mechanism (M0,M 1) in the general case.
In this section we will examine the revenue maximizing mechanism in the case that M0, the set of contracts
available at t=0, takes any possible form in the space (p,x). We will, without loss of generality, restrict
attention to sets that contain relevant contracts.
Lemma 3 Consider an arbitrary set of contracts M. Then the boundary of the convex hull of M is equiv-
alent to the set of contracts in M that are relevant.
13Recall that we renamed (δ,δx)a s( pl,x l).

















A buyer with valuation v ∈ [0,1] faced with M will choose the contract that maximizes his expected payoﬀ;
call it (pv,x v). The buyer’s maximized payoﬀ is given by
UM(v)=s u p
￿
vTx : x ∈ M
￿
.
Then the convex hull of the set M is given by
CM =
￿
x ∈ ￿2 : vTx ≤ UM(v)f o rv ∈￿ 2
￿
.
Consider the set of contracts in M that are optimal choices of a buyer with valuation v. This set is a subset




x ∈ ￿2 such that UM(v)=s u p
￿
vTx : x ∈ M
￿
for v ∈ [0,1]
￿
.
Note that if M is not convex than the set Mrelevant will contain some points that are not elements of M.
Strictly speaking only contracts in M ∩ Mrelevant are available to the buyer. The contracts in Mrelevant
that are not elements of M are on straight lines with slope v ∈ [0,1]. Consider such a line and let v be
its slope . The contracts on this line will be chosen in the event that the buyer has valuation v. Since this
is a probability zero event, the sets Mrelevant and M ∩ Mrelevant generate the same expected revenues.
We therefore, consider these sets as equivalent. In other words, the boundary of the convex hull of M is
equivalent to the set of contracts in M that are relevant with respect to M.
Lemma 4 Any set MK that consists of K relevant contracts can be equivalently described by a piecewise
linear continuous function ¯ MK(p) which is constructed by connecting two adjacent contracts of MK by
straight lines.
Proof. Straightforward.
24Figure 4: Two equivalent sets of contracts.
Recall that a relevant set of contracts does not contain two contracts with the same ﬁrst coordinate.
Hence, Mrelevant can be represented by a function of p, denoted by m(p). This function is convex since
it represents contracts that are on the boundary of the convex hull of M. It follows from the deﬁnition
of m(p) that its slope will be between zero and one, since v ∈ [0,1]. The function m :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1]14
is continuous on [0,1] (see Rockafellar (1970) Theorem 10.1 p. 82). In what follows we will use m(p)t o
represent the set of contracts M ∩ Mrelevant. Figure (5) provides an illustration of the above analysis.
Lemma 5 An arbitrary set of relevant contracts can be uniformly approximated by a piecewise linear
function which is equivalent to a set that contains a ﬁnite number of contracts.
Proof. Let M be an arbitrary set of relevant contracts. Since M is relevant we can represent it by a
continuous and convex function on [0,1]; call this function m(p). Since m(p)i sc o n t i n u o u so nac o m p a c t
subset of the real line it is uniformly continuous. Divide [0,1] into cells adding intermediate points 0 ≤
p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p3 ≤ .. ≤ pl ≤ .. ≤ pn = 1, so that pi − pi−1 < ∆( 1
n). Let pl =δ. Connect the points (pi,m(pi))
and deﬁne the resulting piecewise continuous function m 1
n(p). By Lemma (4) this function is equivalent
to a set that contains contracts {(0,0),(p1,x 1),...,(δ,δx),...(pn,x n)}. These contracts are relevant since
they belong to M which is by assumption relevant.
14A contract with expected payment strictly greater than 1 is not individually rational for a buyer with valuation in [0,1].
25Figure 5: The left ﬁgure depicts a mechanism (M0,M 1). T h er i g h tﬁ g u r ed e p i c t st h er e l e v a n tc o n t r a c t so f
the mechanism (M0,M 1) represented by the function m(p).
We claim that m 1
n(p) approximates m(p) uniformly on [0,1] within 1
n. We want to show that
￿ ￿ ￿m 1
n(p) −m(p)




Consider an arbitrary p. Then it must belong in an interval; call it Ij = [pj−1,p j]. The function m 1
n on
this interval is given by the line segment that connects (pj,m(pj)) and (pj−1,m(pj−1)). Using the linearity
of m 1
n on Ij weg e tt h a t
￿ ￿ ￿m 1
n(p) −m(p)
￿ ￿ ￿ ≤










￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
≤









(pj − pj−1) −m(p)
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
≤
￿ ￿ ￿m 1
n(pj−1) +m 1
n(pj) − m 1
n(pj−1)− m(p)
￿ ￿ ￿





The ﬁrst inequality follows the fact that pj ≥ p, and the rest follows after replacing m 1
n by its deﬁnition.
It follows that we can approximate a set that contains a continuum of relevant contracts uniformly by
26piecewise linear and continuous functions m 1
n(p).
We proceed to showthat even w hen the seller has the option to choose M0 out of a class of sets that
contain a continuum of contracts, in equilibrium M0 wi l lb ee q u i v a l e n tt oap o s t e dp r i c e .T h i si st h em a i n
result of the paper.
Theorem 2 When M is chosen among arbitrary sets and f satisﬁes Assumption D, the revenue maxi-
mizing mechanism is equivalent to posting a price in each period.
Proof. The proof follows from the following steps.
Step 1 : In this step we show that the behavior of the buyer faced with two diﬀerent sets of contracts
that are arbitrarily close essentially remains the same.
Consider a mechanism (M0,M 1)a n dl e tm(p) represent the relevant contracts of M0 ∪M1. Nowdeﬁne
a sequence of piecewise linear continuous functions m 1
n(p) by connecting two nearby points of ,m (p)
(p,m(p)) and (p+ 1
n,m(p+ 1





n ∈ N uniformly
approximates m(p). Consider an equilibrium where the seller oﬀers m(p).Suppose that the buyer’s valuation
is v ∈ [0,1] and given the available choices the buyer chooses a contract out of m(p)c a l li t( pv,m(pv)).
Consider the situation where the seller oﬀers m 1
n(p)i n s t e a do fm(p). We need to examine whether the
b u y e r ’ sb e h a v i o rwh e nf a c e dwi t h m 1
n(p),will be ’close’ to his behavior when he is faced with m(p).
Suppose that the buyer, when faced with m 1





n)) which is such that
such that p￿
v( 1
n) ￿= pv( 1










Given the continuity of the buyers payoﬀ, taking limit as n →∞of the above expression we get that15
p￿
vv −m(p￿
v) >p vv − m(pv)( 2 9 )








n distance from (pv,m(pv)).
27From the above analysis it follows that for n large enough, the buyer with valuation v will ﬁnd optimal
to choose the contract (pv( 1
n),x1
n(pv( 1
n))wh i c hi sc l o s et o( pv,m(pv)).
The behavior of the buyer remains essentially unchanged when the seller instead of oﬀering m(p)o ﬀ e r s
m 1
n(p) that uniformly approximates m(p).
Step 2: Consider a set of period 0 contracts that consists of the status quo contract and n other
relevant contracts, call it M0( 1
n) and let M1 denote the set of period 1 contracts. We require that the set
M0( 1
n)∪M1 be relevant. In this step we argue that, holding M1 ﬁxed, the seller’s revenues weakly increase
when M0( 1
n) is chosen to be equivalent to the set {(0,0),(pn,x n)}. This set contains a singleton contract
and the outside option. The proof of the argument follows closely the proof of Lemma 1, with the only
diﬀerence being that M1 =( δ,δx)i sn o wb e i n gh e l dﬁ x e d ,s ow eo m i ti t .H o l d i n gM1
16 ﬁxed, the seller
will maximize revenues by setting M0( 1
n) = {(0,0),(pn,x n)}. It follows from Lemma (2) that pn =1 . I n
equilibrium the set M0( 1
n) is equivalent to a posted price.
In step 1 we saw that the buyer’s behavior when faced with m(p)a n dm 1
n (p),that uniformly approx-
imates m(p), remains essentially unchanged. In step 2 we proved that in equilibrium the set M0( 1
n)(p)
will be set equivalent to a posted price. From Lemma (4), we know that M0( 1
n) ∪M1 can be equivalently
described by a piecewise linear function; call this function m 1
n. Combining the above results we see that,
in the case that the seller chooses M0 out of a general class of sets, the optimal mechanism is equivalent
to posting a price in each period.
7 Commitment and Non-Commitment: Revenue comparisons.
Now that we have characterized the revenue maximizing mechanism in a two-period environment with no
commitment, we turn to compare the seller’s revenues under commitment and under non-commitment.
Expected revenues under commitment in our model are characterized in Myerson (1981), who derives
the optimal static auction. Recall that under commitment, the seller will never change the rules of the
institution she initially chose, even if it turns out that ex-post it failed to sell the object. In our environment
16Recall that M1 = {(δ,δx)}.
28the seller faces the same buyer at the beginning of period 0 and at the beginning of period 1. Under
commitment the seller oﬀers the same institution at the beginning period 0 and at the beginning of period
1. This implies that the ﬁnal allocation will be determined at t=0.
From Myerson’s analysis it follows that, under commitment and when the seller faces one buyer, the





In the case that the buyer behaves sequentially rationally, it was shown in this paper that the revenue









Observe that the seller can replicate the situation under non-commitment in the commitment case by
oﬀering contracts (δ,δx1)a n d( 1 ,x 0) instead of oﬀering contract (1,x). By doing so, she can obtain the
same expected revenues as in the non-commitment case. From this observation it follows that in general
ΠC ≥ ΠNC(δ).
Claim: There exists some ¯ δ high enough such that when δ ≥ ¯ δ, then the seller will post such a price
at t=0, such that all trade takes place in the ﬁnal period of the game where the seller has commitment
power.
When the buyer and the seller are very patient, (in this model the buyer and the seller have the same
discount factor), the seller will ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to shift all trade at the last period of the game. In the last
period of the game she has commitment power. If δ = 1 by shifting all trade at t=1 she obtains expected
revenues equal to ΠC, which is the best she can hope for. When δ =1t h es e l l e rwi l lp o s tap r i c ea tt = 1




xf(t)dt =Π C. (30)
29Claim: There exists ε>0 such that when δ<ε ,t h es e l l e rwi l lp o s ts u c hap r i c ea tt = 1s u c ht h a t ,i f
trade takes place, it takes place at t=0.
For δ very small in equilibrium all buyer types that accept a sales contract will accept a sales contract
oﬀered at t=0. This follows from the fact that when δ is very small the value of the object at t=1 is almost
zero to the buyer no matter what his valuation is, so there is not much surplus for the seller to extract.
When the seller and the buyer are very impatient the situation is almost equivalent to the full commitment
case. A small discount factor implies that the future is relatively unimportant, so the gain from behaving
sequentially rationally is minimal. When δ → 0 the seller posts at t=0 the revenue maximizing price as in
the environment with commitment. Her expected revenues are ΠNC(0) = ΠC.
From the above analysis it follows that for extreme values of the discount factor the seller can achieve
the expected revenues under commitment even when she behaves sequentially rationally. For intermediate
v a l u e so ft h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o ri th o l d st h a tΠ NC < ΠC. T og e ts o m ei d e aa b o u tt h em a g n i t u d eo ft h e
diﬀerence in expected revenues, the reader is referred to the examples presented in the next section.
8E x a m p l e s
To illustrate the ideas developed in the previous sections we present two examples in some detail.
We ﬁrst look at the case where the seller in period t=0 makes the following oﬀer to the buyer: “you
will obtain the object with probability 1 if you pay x0 ”. Formally this oﬀer means that M0 contains
two contracts (K = 2): the exit option (0,0) and contract (1,x 0). If the buyer decides to wait, the seller
makes the following oﬀer to the buyer: “you will obtain the object with probability 1 if you pay x1”. More
formally, the seller oﬀers at t=1 the contract (1,x 1). Basically, the seller posts the price x0 at period t=0
and x1 at t=1. We have shown, that under some circumstances, this in fact the optimal thing to do.
In the second example the seller at period zero makes the following oﬀer: “you will obtain the object
with probability p1 if you pay x1 and with probability 1 if you pay x2 ”. Formally the seller oﬀers the
contracts (0,0), (p1,x 1)a n d( 1 ,x 2)a tt = 0 .A tt = 1s h ep o s t sap r i c eo fx. We demonstrate that by oﬀering
the extra contract (p1,x 1)a tt = 0t h es e l l e rc a nd on ob e t t e rt h a nb yj u s to ﬀ e r i n g( 1 ,x 2).
30These simple examples demonstrate the essence of our results: even by oﬀering inﬁnitely many contracts
at period t=0 the seller will do no better than by posting a price: choosing the appropriate price to post
is all the seller needs to do in order to maximize expected revenues. Calculating the optimal price is a
relatively straightforward task and it is best the seller can do!
8.1 I. Posting a Price at each Period.
Assume that the buyer’s valuation is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]. There are two periods




denote the valuation of the buyer who is indiﬀerent between (1,x 0)a n d( 1 ,x 1). We assume that all
contracts are relevant which implies that x0 ≤ x1, then
• a buyer with valuation [0,x 1)c h o o s e s( 0 ,0) at t=0
• a buyer with valuation [x1,v 1] chooses contract M1
•ab u y e rwi t hv a l u a t i o n( v1,1] chooses contract (1,x 0).
Suppose that the buyer after seeing M0 decides to wait. The seller believes that she faces a buyer with
valuation in [v,¯ v]. In an equilibrium M1 must be optimal given beliefs and beliefs must be consistent with
players’ actions. Posterior beliefs are given by F1(t)=
F(t)−F(v)





I no r d e rt h a tt h i si sa ne q u i l i b r i u mi tm u s th o l dt h a t
v = x1 and ¯ v = v1.





31Given the above relationship between x1,v 1 and x0 the seller will pick x0 that maximizes revenues, given















Discount Factor δ Price at t=0, x0 Price at t=1, x1 v1= x0
1−0.5δ ΠNC
0.00010 .49999 0.25001 0.50002 0.24999
0.30 .46612 0.27419 0.54839 0.23306
0.40 .45714 0.28571 0.57143 0.22857
0.45 0.45330 0.29245 0.58491 0.22665
0.50 .45 0.30 .60 .225
0.70 .44474 0.34211 0.68422 0.22237
0.90 .46538 0.42308 0.84615 0.23269
0.9999 0.49995 0.4999 0.9998 0.24998
10 .50 .51 0 .25
F o rt h i se x a m p l et h es e l l e r ’ se x p e c t e dr e v e n u ewh e ns h ei sa b l et oc o m m i ti sΠ C =0 .25.
8.2 II. “Type II Equilibria”:Oﬀering More options at t=0.
Suppose that the seller oﬀers at t=0 the choice between three sale contracts M0 = {(0,0),(p1,x 1)a n d( 1 ,x 2)}
a n da tp e r i o dt = 1s h ep o s t sap r i c ex, i.e. M1 = {(δ,δx)}. Again, we assume that the buyer’s valuation is
uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1].
8.2.1 Case 1:p1 <δ<1
Fix p1 and δ. Since we require that in equilibrium all contracts in M0 and in M1 be relevant, it holds that
p1 <δ<1
32Figure 6: The sequentially optimal mechanism
x1 ≤ δx ≤ x2
x1
p1
≤ v1 ≤ v2.




is indiﬀerent between (p1,x 1) and paying price x at period 1. A buyer with valuation v<˜ v1 prefers (p1,x 1)




is indiﬀerent between paying x2 t=0 and paying x at t=1. A buyer with valuation v>˜ v2 prefers (1,x 2)
to (δ,δx) and a buyer with valuation v<˜ v2 prefers (δ,δx)t o( 1 ,x 2).
Suppose that the buyer after seeing M0 decides to wait. The seller believes that she is facing a buyer
with valuation in [v,¯ v].M 1 must be optimal given beliefs and in order that this is an equilibrium it must
hold that
v =˜ v1 and ¯ v =˜ v2.
At t=1 the conditional CDF for the buyer’s valuation is given by
F(x)−F(˜ v1)
F(˜ v2)−F(˜ v1) . At t=1 given posterior
distribution, F1(.),which is determined by ˜ v1 and ˜ v2, the seller will pick the price that maximizes her
33expected revenues from t=1 onwards. The price posted at t=1, x, is a root of the following equation
f(x)x +F(x)− F(˜ v2)=0 .
The optimal mechanism for t=1 in a type II equilibrium will be of the form x(˜ v2). We can substitute this





This expresses the revenue maximizing M1 given posterior beliefs. Substituting this equation into ˜ v1 and
˜ v2 and after rearranging we get that
x1 =0 .5δ˜ v2 −(δ −p1)˜ v1
x2 =( 1 − 0.5δ)˜ v2.














Substituting x(˜ v2),x 1(δ,˜ v1,˜ v2)a n dx2(δ,˜ v1,˜ v2) into revenues we get an expression that depends only on
δ, p0, (which are ﬁxed parameters) and ˜ v1, ˜ v2 which are the choice variables. In the uniform case the seller
seeks










[0.5δ˜ v2 −(δ −p1)˜ v1]p1
+δ(˜ v2 − ˜ v1)˜ v2





We solved the problem imposing the restriction that all contracts oﬀered are relevant in equilibrium. Recall
that δ and p1 are ﬁxed parameters in the problem.
Results for case 1: p1 <δ<1
34δ p1 x1 xx 2
x1
p1 ˜ v1 ˜ v2 ΠNC
0.20 .10 .0265 0.2647 0.4765 0.2647 0.2647 0.5294 0.2382
0.30 .10 .0274 0.2742 0.4661 0.2742 0.2742 0.5484 0.2331
0.40 .10 .0286 0.2857 0.4571 0.2857 0.2857 0.5714 0.2286
0.50 .10 .03 0.30 .45 0.30 .30 .60 .225
0.70 .10 .0342 0.3421 0.4447 0.3421 0.3421 0.6842 0.2224
0.90 .10 .0423 0.4231 0.4654 0.4231 0.4231 0.8462 0.2327
0.9999 0.10 .05 0.4999 0.4999 0.4999 0.4999 0.9998 0.25
0.9999 0.50 .2499 0.4999 0.4999 0.4999 0.4999 0.9998 0.25
0.70 .50 .1711 0.3421 0.4447 0.3421 0.3421 0.6842 0.2224
The solution was obtained numerically. Note that for any discount factor we get that x = x1
p1 =˜ v1 which
i m p l i e st h a tn ob u y e rp i c k s( p1,x 1). A buyer with valuation in [0,˜ v1 = x1
p1 = x)c h o o s e s( 0 ,0). A buyer
with valuation in [x =˜ v1,˜ v2]c h o o s e sM1 = {(δ,δx)}, and a buyer with valuation in [˜ v2,1] chooses (1,x 2).
Hence contract (p1,x 1)i ss u p e r ﬂ u o u s .R e c a l lt h a tp1 is a ﬁxed parameter and notice that the results do
not depend on p1; as an illustration we provide the result for δ =0 .9999 and for δ =0 .7 in the case that
p1 =0 .1a n dp1 =0 .5. We see that the results obtained in this example are identical to the case that the
seller posts a price at t=0. They generate the same revenues (up to some rounding) and v1 =˜ v2.
8.2.2 Case 2:δ<p 1 < 1.
Fix δ and p1. Since we require that the set M0 ∪M1 be relevant, it must hold that
δ<p 1 < 1( 3 1 )
δx ≤ x1 ≤ x2 (32)
and
x ≤ v1 ≤ v2. (33)
35Figure 7: Type II Equilibrium. Case 1: p1 <δ<1.








A buyer with valuation ¯ v1 is indiﬀerent between (p1,x 1)a n d( 1 ,x 2). A buyer with valuation v>¯ v1 prefers
(p1,x 1)t o( δ,δx) and a buyer with valuation v<¯ v1 prefers (δ,δx)t o( p1,x 1). Similarly a buyer with
valuation ¯ v2 is indiﬀerent between (p1,x 1)a n d( 1 ,x 2). A buyer with valuation v<¯ v2 prefers (p1,x 1)t o
(1,x 2) and a buyer with valuation v>¯ v2 prefers (1,x 2)t o( p1,x 1).
In summary a buyer with valuation in [0,x)c h o o s e s( 0 ,0) at t=0, with valuation [x,¯ v1)c h o o s e sM1 =
{(δ,δx)}, a buyer with valuation in [¯ v1,¯ v2)c h o o s e s( p1,x 1) at t=0 and ﬁnally a buyer with valuation in
[¯ v2,1] chooses (1,x 2)a tt = 0 .





Substituting this expression into ¯ v1 and ¯ v2 and after rearranging we get that
x2 =( 1 − p1)¯ v2 +(p1 −0.5δ)¯ v1 (36)
x1 =( p1 −0.5δ)¯ v1. (37)

















+(¯ v2 − ¯ v1)p1(p1 − 0.5δ)¯ v1 +( 1− ¯ v2)[(1−p1)¯ v2 +( p1 − 0.5δ)¯ v1]. (39)
We derived the solution assuming that the contracts in M0 and in M1 must be relevant.
Results for case 2: δ<p 1 < 1
δ p1 x1 xx 2
x1
p1 ¯ v1 ¯ v2 ΠNC
0.30 .50 .1919 0.2742 0.4661 0.3839 0.5484 0.5484 0.2331
0.40 .50 .1714 0.2857 0.4571 0.3429 0.5714 0.5714 0.2286
0.45 0.50 .1608 0.2925 0.4533 0.3217 0.5849 0.5849 0.2267
The solution was obtained numerically. Note that for any discount factor we get that ¯ v1 =¯ v2 that is,
(p1,x 1) will be chosen only if the buyer has valuation ¯ v1, which is a probability zero event. A buyer with
valuation v ∈ [x,¯ v2)c h o o s e sM1 = {(δ,δx)} and a buyer with valuation in [¯ v2,1] chooses (1,x 2). The
solution is identical to the one we derived for the case that the seller just posts a price at t=0! Contract
(p1,x 1) is superﬂuous and expected revenues are the same as in the case that the seller posts a price at
t=0 (along with the status quo contract).
9Co n c l u s i o n
In this paper we characterize the revenue maximizing mechanism when the seller behaves sequentially
rationally. We showthat the revenue maximizing mechanism in an environment w ith no commitment is
to post a price in each period. In particular, for any possible history of the game, at the beginning of the
period t=1 the seller will maximize expected revenues by posting a price. In deriving his result, we restrict
37attention to direct revelation mechanisms. We are able to do so, since the seller’s problem at the beginning
of t=1 is isomorphic to her problem with full commitment. Subsequently, we derive the revenue maximizing
set of contracts for t=0; this is a more diﬃcult task since one cannot appeal to the revelation principle.
We do not impose any restrictions on the potential form of the mechanism. Under some conditions on the
probability density function of the buyer’s valuation, the revenue maximizing mechanism at period t=0 is
to post a price.
This work extends the works of Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Hart and Tirole
(1988). The most closely related paper is the one by Hart and Tirole (1988). In a T-period framework
where the buyer’s valuation is either high or low, Hart and Tirole examine, among others, the situation
where the seller and the buyer sign one-period contracts, known as the non-commitment case. They assume,
that under non-commitment the seller’s strategy is to post a price. In this paper we derive the revenue
maximizing mechanism under non-commitment for the case that the buyer’s valuation is drawn from a
continuum. The methodology developed in this paper may be useful in deriving the optimal incentive
scheme in other asymmetric information environments where the principle is unable to commit and the
agent’s type is drawn from a continuum. This has been done so far only for the case that the agent has
two possible types.
Previous work has assumed that the seller’s strategy is to post a price and the problem of the seller is
to ﬁnd what price to post. We provide a reason for the seller’s choice to post a price, even though she can
use inﬁnitely many other possible institutions: posted price selling is the optimal strategy in the sense that
it maximizes the seller’s revenues. In the future we plan to work on eliminating the somewhat restrictive
assumptions we made on the probability density function of the buyer’s valuation. We also plan to study
the problem in a T-period framework and in the case that the seller faces more than one buyer. Another
important question related to this research is howthe seller’s inability to commit aﬀects eﬃciency. This
question is relevant when the seller faces more then one buyer.
If in reality individuals in charge of designing institutions are unable to commit, then the appropriate




Deﬁnition 4 Given a point x of [0,1] and an open set U of space [0,1] let
S(x,U)=
￿
p | p ∈ [0,1][0,1] and p(x) ∈ U
￿
The sets S(x,U) are a subbasis for a topology on [0,1][0,1] which is called the topology of pointwise conver-
gence. The typical basis element about a function p consists of all functions g that are close to p at ﬁnitely
many points.
Theorem 3 As e q ue n c e pn of functions converges to a function p in the topology of pointwise convergence
if and only if for each x ∈ X(=[ 0 ,1] in our problem), the sequence pn(x) of points of Y (= [0,1] in our
problem) converges to the point p(x).
Proof. See Munkres “Topology: A ﬁrst Course” page 281.
Deﬁnition 5 A topological space X is said to be sequentially compact if every inﬁnite sequence from X
has a convergent subsequence. A subspace Y of X is sequentially compact if every sequence from Y has a
convergent subsequence that converges to an element of Y.
Theorem 4 Let X be a metrizable topological space . Then the following are equivalent. (1) X is compact
(2) X is limit point compact (3) X is sequentially compact
Proof. See Munkres “Topology: A ﬁrst Course” p. 181.
Theorem 5 (Helly) Let {pn} be a sequence of functions in ￿. Then there exists a function p ∈￿and a
subsequence of {pn} that converges weakly to p.
This is a slightly adapted version of Helly’s Theorem discussed in Stockey &Lucas: ’Recursive Methods
in Economic Dynamics’ pages 371-373.
39Remark 2 From Theorem (3) and Helly’s Theorem it follows that the sequence pn converges to p in the
topology of pointwise convergence.
Theorem 6 (Lebesque’s Dominated Convergence Theorem) Let g be a measurable function over a mea-
surable set E, and suppose that {pn} is a sequence of measurable functions on E such that
|pn(x)| ≤ g(x)
and for almost all x ∈ E we have pn(x) → p(x). Then
￿
E




Proof. See Royden (1962) p.76.
Remark 3 The above theorem shows that
￿
E p is lower and upper semicontinuous and hence continuous.
10.2 Proofs of the results.
Proof of Proposition (1)
(i) We start by proving the existence result.
Step 1: (Compactness) The set ￿ is compact in the topology of pointwise convergence. This follows
from Helly’s Theorem together with Theorems (3) and (4).
Step2: (Continuity) We want to show that the objective function is continuous on [0,1] in the topology
of pointwise convergence. Take E=[0,1] which is a measurable set, and g is given by
g(t)=1∀t ∈ [0,1].
Note that g is measurable since it is a constant function. Our space ￿ consists of measurable functions
p(.). Continuity of the objective function follows from Lebesque’s Dominated Convergence Theorem.
We are done since a continuous function on a compact set assumes its minimum and its maximum
So far we have established that the maximization problem given by (8) has a maximum. We will
nowproceed to showthat the maximizer is of the form w here v ∈ [0,1]. Note that the functions deﬁned
40above are in ￿ since they are measurable, continuous everywhere form above, increasing and p(0) = 0 and
p(1) = 1.
(ii).The objective function is linear in the choice variable so the maximizer will be an extreme point of
the set of maximizers.
The set of extreme points of ￿ is
K = ∪v∈[0,1]pv(.)
where pv is deﬁned in (10) .
Every increasing, non-negative function F with F(1) = 1 can be written as a convex combination of





Let p∗ be a maximizer of the problem deﬁned in (8). Let M∗ denote the maximum value of the objective



















This is a convex combination of functions of the form given in (10). Hence one of these functions is a
maximizer.
Proof of Proposition(2)
(i) First note that v∗ is well-deﬁned because the set
￿
v ∈ [0,1] such that
￿ ˜ v
v
φ(t)dt ≥ 0, for all ˜ v ∈ [v,1]
￿
is non-empty since it contains 1.
Fix arbitrary v1 ∈ [0,1] such that v1 <v ∗. Suppose that p(v1) > 0, this implies that ∀v￿ ≥ v1
p(v￿) ≥ p(v1)
41by the requirement that p(.) be increasing. By the deﬁnition of v∗ and since v1 <v ∗, there must exist









then there exists ˜ v1 such that
￿ ˜ v1
v
φ(t)dt and ˜ v ≤ v∗.












φ(t)dt, since ¯ v1 >v ∗.
But
￿ ¯ v1









for every v1 ∈ [0,v ∗]. Call this ˜ v1 =¯ v1.
Back to the proof of Proposition (2). We proceed to demonstrate why it can not be optimal to set
p(t) > 0f o rt<v ∗.
Suppose that v∗ > 0.Fix v<v ∗.For any v<v ∗ there exists v￿ ≤ v∗such that
￿ v￿
v
φ(t)dt < 0. (40)
42Case 1: Suppose that there exists v￿￿ ∈ [v,v￿) such that
￿ v￿￿
v
φ(t)dt > 0. (41)
Let
¯ v =s u p
￿
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Suppose that p(t) > 0f o rs o m et ∈ [v,¯ v]. By the requirement that p(.)b en o n - d e c r e a s i n gi tm u s th o l dt h a t
p(s) ≥ p(¯ v) ≥ p(t) for all t ∈ [¯ v,v￿].
Suppose














The last inequality follows from (40), (41) and (42). Hence p(t) > 0f o rt ∈ [v,v￿] cannot be optimal.




then setting p(t) > 0f o rs o m et ∈ [v,v￿] clearly cannot be optimal.
Noww e’d like to showthat setting p(t) < 1f o rt ∈ [v∗,1] cannot be optimal. We will argue by
contradiction. Suppose that for some t ≥ v∗ it holds that p(t) < 1 . This implies that for every s<t ,


















(ii) This is straightforward.
Proof of Proposition (3)
If V1 is empty or it contains one element we are done. Suppose that the cardinality V1 is at least 2.
Let v1 and v2 be elements of V1. This implies that a buyer with valuation v1 and a buyer with valuation
v2 prefer M1 =( δ,δv∗) to their most preferred point of M0. Let (p01,x 01)b es u c ht h a t
(p01,x 01) ∈ arg max
(p,x)∈M0
(pv1 − x).
Then it must hold that
δv1 − δv∗ ≥ p01v1 −x01. (43)
Similarly, let (p02,x 02) be such that
(p02,x 02) ∈ arg max
(p,x)∈M0
(pv2 − x).
Then it must hold that
δv2 − δv∗ ≥ p02v2 −x02. (44)
Consider a buyer with type αv1+(1−α)v2; a buyer with this type exists since we assumed that the support
of the buyer’s valuation is convex. Let
(¯ p, ¯ x) ∈ arg max
(p,x)∈M0
p(αv1 +( 1− α)v2) −x.
We want to show that
δ(αv1 +(1−α)v2) −δv∗ ≥ ¯ p(αv1 +(1−α)v2) − ¯ x.
We will argue by contradiction. Suppose
δ(αv1 +( 1− α)v2) − δv∗ < ¯ p(αv1 +( 1− α)v2) − ¯ x
44which can be rewritten as
α[(¯ pv1 − ¯ x)− (δv1 − δv∗)] +(1− α)[(¯ pv2 − ¯ x) −(δv2 −δv∗)] > 0.
This inequality implies that at least one of the two summands of the LHS is strictly greater than zero,
which in turn implies that
¯ pv1 − ¯ x>δ v 1 −δv∗
or
¯ pv2 − ¯ x>δ v 2 −δv∗
or both hold. The last statement contradicts the fact that if the buyers has valuation vi,i=1 ,2, he prefers
(δ,δv∗)t oe v e r yp o i n to fM0.
Proof of Lemma 1.
In an equilibrium, where M0 is chosen among the sets of contracts that are relevant and contain K
contracts (including the status quo contract), the seller’s equilibrium strategy is a vector (x1,x 2,....,xk−1)
that maximizes expected revenues taking (p1,......,pk−1)a sg i v e n .
We will look at the partial derivatives of expected revenues, R, with respect to each xi in M0.17




















































17Essentially the seller determines p too, since by picking appropriate x, she can make a point (p,x) essentially irrelevant
(this simply means that in equilibrium, given all the other available contracts, contract (p,x) will be chosen with probability
zero).
45If f(v1) ≥ f(x1












































This inequality holds under Assumption D. Under our assumptions revenues are non-decreasing in x1. The
constraint x1
p1 ≤ v1 is binding so the seller will set x1 as large as possible. The seller sets x1 such that
x1
p1 = v1. Notice that x1
p1 = v1 implies that v1 = x2
p2 and when x1
p1 = v1 = x2









x2p2 +( F(v3) − F(v2))p3x3
+(F(v4) −F(v3))x4p4 +(F(v5)− F(v4))x5p5
+(F(v6) −F(v5))p6x6..... +(1−F(vK−1))pKxK
Nowgiven that at the optimum it holds that x1
p1 = v1 = x2
p2, l e tu se x a m i n et h ee ﬀ e c to fx2 on revenues.



















Using parallel arguments to the ones used above it can be shown that, under our assumptions, revenues
are increasing in x2 which implies that the seller will set x2 as large as possible: x2
p2 = v2 which implies
that x1
p1 = v1 = x2
p2 = v2 = x3
p3. C o n t i n u i n gi nt h es a m ewa ywes e et h a tr e v e n u e sa r ei n c r e a s i n gi n xi,
i =1 ,...l−2.
46Noww e examine w hether revenues are increasing in xl−1. This is the payment associated with the
contract adjacent to M1.W h e nx1
p1 = v1 = x2
p2 = v2 = .. =
xl−2








xl−1pl−1 +( F(vl)− F(vl−1))δx

















which can be shown to be non-negative under the assumptions made so far. Hence at the optimum the






pl−1 = vl−1 = x.
Noww e look at the eﬀect of a change in xl+1 on revenues, when x1
p1 = v1 = x2



















pl+1 −δ + δ ∂x
∂vl
Recall from Proposition (4) that x is non-decreasing and diﬀerentiable almost everywhere, hence ∂x
∂vl ≥ 0.
This says that as the upper bound of the support of the posterior distribution of the buyer’s valuation
increases the price posted at t=1 will not decrease. When x1
p1 = v1 = x2
p2 = v2 = .. =
xl−2
pl−2 = vl−2 =
xl−1
pl−1 =
vl−1 holds, then expected revenues are given by
R =( F(vl)− F(x))δx+(F(vl+1) − F(vl))pl+1xl+1 +
+(F(vl+2)− F(vl+1))pl+2xl+2 + ..... +(1−F(vK−1))pKxK.




















Notice that by (18), for vH = vl, the ﬁrst term of the above expression is always equal to zero. From
the assumption that the seller oﬀers relevant contracts it holds that vl+1 ≥ vl and pl+2xl+2 ≥ pl+1xl+1. If
δx ≥ pl+1xl+1 it follows immediately that expected revenues are non-decreasing in xl+1. I nt h ec a s et h a t
δx ≤ pl+1xl+1 we need to do a little bit more work.













pl+2xl+2 (pl+1 − δ)+δx(pl+2 − pl+1)− pl+1xl+1(pl+2 − δ)
(pl+2 − pl+1)
￿

























The ﬁrst term of the above expression is non-negative given that vl+1 ≥ vl. The second term is also
non-negative for the following reasons
vl+1 ≥ vl reduces to
xl+2(pl+1 −δ)+δx(pl+2 −pl+1) ≥ xl+1 (pl+2 − δ)
48multiplying both sides of the above inequality by pl+2 > 0weg e tt h a t
pl+2[xl+2(pl+1 − δ)+δx(pl+2 −pl+1)] ≥ pl+2 [xl+1(pl+2 −δ)]
but since pl+1 <p l+2 ≤ 1weg e tt h a t
pl+2xl+2(pl+1 −δ)+δx(pl+2 − pl+1) ≥ pl+1xl+1 (pl+2 − δ).
The third term of (47) is non-negative since, by the assumption that the seller oﬀers relevant contracts, we
have that pl+2xl+2 >p l+1xl+1. Hence for expected revenues to be non-decreasing in xl+1 it will suﬃce if
(F(vl+1) −F(vl))pl+1 +(f(vl)− f(vl+1))
￿
pl+1xl+1 −δx




holds. This follows from Assumption D. Given the hypotheses made, the seller will pick xl+1 as large as
possible, which implies that at the optimum it will hold
vl = vl+1.
Nowreplace vl by vl+1. Taking derivative with respect to xl+2, which is just a renaming of our previous
step, we get that vl+1 must be set equal to vl+2. Continue analogously. So in the end we get that
vl = vl+1 = ..... = vK−1.
The revenue maximizing vector (x1,......xK) is such that all contracts in M0, but contract18 (pK,x K)a r e
essentially irrelevant. In equilibrium when M0 is taken among the class of sets that contain K relevant
contracts, then it, (M0), is chosen to be equivalent to a singleton contract (pK,x K).
Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. We have shown so far that in an equilibrium, when M0 is chosen among the class of sets that
contain K relevant contracts, xi, i=1, .....K-1 will be chosen such that the following holds
x1
p1
= v1 = ...... = vl−1 = x
18Contract (p0,x 0) is treated as an outside option.
49and
vl = vl+1 = vl+2 = ........ = vK−1.
In equilibrium, only one contract in M0 is chosen with positive probability, contract (pK,x K). All the
other contracts in M0 are essentially irrelevant, since they are chosen with zero probability. In such an


















We proceed to showthat in equilibrium M0 is equivalent to a posted price, in other words pK is set equal
to 1.

























≤ 1, and δx ≤ xK. Since
expected revenues are non-decreasing in pK, the seller will chose pK to be as large as possible. Hence
pK =1 .
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